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Abstract
A directed graph where there is exactly one edge between every pair of vertices
is called a tournament. Finding the “best” set of vertices of a tournament is a well
studied problem in social choice theory. A tournament solution takes a tournament
as input and outputs a subset of vertices of the input tournament. However, in
many applications, for example, choosing the best set of drugs from a given set
of drugs, the edges of the tournament are given only implicitly and knowing the
orientation of an edge is costly. In such scenarios, we would like to know the
best set of vertices (according to some tournament solution) by “querying” as few
edges as possible. We, in this paper, precisely study this problem for commonly
used tournament solutions: given an oracle access to the edges of a tournament
T , find f(T ) by querying as few edges as possible, for a tournament solution f.
We first show that the set of Condorcet non-losers in a tournament can be found
by querying 2n − ⌊logn⌋ − 2 edges only and this is tight in the sense that every
algorithm for finding the set of Condorcet non-losers needs to query at least 2n −
⌊logn⌋ − 2 edges in the worst case, where n is the number of vertices in the input
tournament. We then move on to study other popular tournament solutions and
show that any algorithm for finding the Copeland set, the Slater set, the Markov set,
the bipartisan set, the uncovered set, the Banks set, and the top cycle must query
Ω(n2) edges in the worst case. On the positive side, we are able to circumvent our
strong query complexity lower bound results by proving that, if the size of the top
cycle of the input tournament is at most k, then we can find all the tournament
solutions mentioned above by querying O(nk + n logn/log(1−1/k)) edges only.
1 Introduction
Many scenarios in multiagent systems can often be modeled and analyzed using tour-
naments [Mou86, BBFH14]. An important example of such scenarios is voting where
we have a set of alternatives and a set of votes which are linear orders over the set
of alternatives. A important tournament to consider in this context is defined by the
majority relation induced by the set of votes. In the majority relation, an alternative
x is preferred over another alternative y if x is preferred over y in a majority of the
votes. Indeed, many important voting rules, like Copeland for example, are defined
using the tournament induced by the majority relation of the input set of votes. Other
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than voting, tournaments have found many applications in multi-criteria decision anal-
ysis [AR+86, BMP+06], zero-sum games [FR95, DLB96], coalitional games [BH10],
argumentation theory [Dun95, Dun07], biology [CH07], etc.
Formally, a tournament is defined as a set of alternatives along with an irreflexive,
antisymmetric, and total relation, called dominance relation, on the set alternatives.
An equivalent and often more convenient view of a tournament is as a directed graph
on the alternatives where, between every pair of vertices (which corresponds to the
alternatives), there is exactly one edge. A tournament solution takes a tournament as
input and outputs a subset of the vertices. Tournament and tournament solutions are
important mathematical tools in any general situation where we have to make a choice
from a set of alternatives solely based on pairwise comparisons.
1.1 Motivation
We often have situations where the input tournament is given “implicitly” – the vertices
of the tournament are given explicitly and we have to query for an edge to know its
orientation. Moreover, knowing the orientation of an edge of the tournament can often
be costly. For example, we can think of an application where we have a set of drugs for
a particular disease and we want to know the “best” (according to some tournament
solution) set of drugs. A natural dominance relation in this context would be to define
a drug x to dominate another drug y if the probability that the drug x cures the disease
is more than the corresponding probability for the drug y. Since these probabilities are
often not known a priori, estimating them often requires extensive lab experiments as
well as clinical trials. Hence, we would like to make as few queries as possible to know
the best set of drugs. More generally, we can think of any tournament based voting
rules like Copeland in an election scenario. A tournament based voting rule chooses
winners solely based on the tournament induced by the pairwise majority relation be-
tween the alternatives. However, in many applications of voting in multiagent systems,
recommender systems [PHG00] for example, the number of voters is huge and conse-
quently, learning the majority relation is costly. Hence, we would like to learn the set of
most popular items (according to the tournament solution under consideration) with
the smallest number of queries possible. Motivated by these applications, we study,
for a tournament solution f, the problem of finding f(T ) of an input tournament T by
querying smallest number of edges possible. A query for an edge, in our model, reveals
the orientation of the edge in the input tournament.
Finding the query complexity of various graph properties has drawn significant
attention in literature. In the most general setting, the input is a directed graph on n
vertices and one has to find whether the input graph satisfies some property we are
concerned with, by asking a minimum number of queries. A query is a question of the
form: “Is there an edge from a vertex x to another vertex y?” The query complexity of a
property is the worst case number of queries that must be made to know whether the
input graph has that property. A graph property, in this context, is called evasive if its
query complexity is n(n − 1), that is, one has to query all possible edges of the input
digraph to test the property in the worst case. Karp conjectured that every monotone
and nontrivial graph property is evasive. A graph property is monotone if it continues
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to hold even after adding more edges and nontrivial if it holds for some but not all
graphs. A substantial amount of research effort has provided increasingly better query
complexity lower bounds for monotone and nontrivial properties, although Karp’s
conjecture remained open [KSS84, Kin88, RV76, Ros73, CKS01, Kul13, KT10]. In the
case of tournaments (where there is exactly one edge between every pair of vertices),
Balasubramanian et al. [BRS97] showed (rediscovered by Procaccia [Pro08]) that a
Condorcet winner – a vertex with n−1 outgoing edges – can be found, if it exists, with
2n − ⌊logn⌋ − 2 queries and this query complexity upper bound is tight in the worst
case. This further motivates us to study the query complexity of other commonly used
tournament solutions.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we prove tight bounds on the query complexity of commonly used tour-
nament solutions. Our specific contributions in this paper are as follows.
– We show that the query complexity of the problem of finding the set of Condorcet
non-losers is 2n − ⌊logn⌋ − 2 [Observation 3.1].
– We show that any algorithm for finding the Copeland set, the Slater set, and
the Markov set in a tournament has query complexity (n
2
) [Theorem 3.1]. We
remark that Goyal et al. [GJR17] also discovered this result independently (and
in parallel) around same time.
– We prove that any algorithm for finding the bipartisan set [Theorem 3.2], the
uncovered set [Theorem 3.3], the Banks set [Theorem 3.4], and the top cycle
[Theorem 3.5] has query complexity Ω(n2).
– We complement the our strong query complexity lower bounds above by showing
that, if the tournament T has a top cycle of size at most k, then the Copeland set,
the Slater set, the Markov set, the bipartisan set, the uncovered set, the Banks set,
and the top cycle of a tournament T can be found using O(nk + n logn/log(1−1/k))
queries [Theorem 4.1 and 4.2].
1.3 Related Work
The work of Balasubramanian et al. [BRS97] (rediscovered by Procaccia [Pro08]) is
the closest predecessor of our work where he shows that the query complexity of
Condorcet winner in tournaments is 2n − ⌊logn⌋ − 2. There have been several other
works in the literature which study the query complexity of various problems in tour-
naments. For example, Noy and Naor use comparison-based sorting algorithms to
find feedback sets and Hamiltonian paths in tournaments [BNN90]. There have been
works in computational social choice theory on communication complexity of differ-
ent voting rules [CS02] and query complexity of preference elicitation in various do-
mains [Con09, DM16a, DM16b, Dey16]. However, the querying model in the above
works is completely different from ours and consequently, neither the results nor the
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techniques involved in these works are directly applicable to our work; a query in the
works above asks: “Does a voter v prefer an alternative x over another alternative y?”
2 Preliminaries
For a positive integer ℓ, we denote the set {1,2, . . . , ℓ} by [ℓ]. For a finite set X and a
positive integer ℓ, we denote the set of all subsets of X of size ℓ by Pℓ(X ) and the set
of all probability distributions on X by ∆(X ).
Tournaments. A tournament T = (V,E) is a directed graph on a set V of n vertices
such that, for any two vertices u,v ∈ V, either (u,v) ∈ E or (v,u) ∈ E but not both. If
not mentioned otherwise, we denote the number of voters by n. We call any subgraph
of a tournament a partial tournament. We call a tournament balanced if the in-degree
and out-degree of every vertex are the same. A tournament T defines a relation ≻T on
the set of vertices V: u ≻T v if (u,v) ∈ T . Alternatively, any irreflexive, antisymmetric,
and total relation ≻ on a set V defines a tournament T = (V,E) where (u,v) ∈ E if
u ≻ v. When there is no possibility of confusion, we drop T from the subscript of ≻.
We call the relation ≻T associated with a tournament T the dominance relation of T .
We say a vertex u dominates or defeats another vertex v if u ≻T v. Let us define the
dominion D(v) of a vertex v as D(v) = {u ∈ V ∶ v ≻ u} and D(v) is called the dominators
of v. Given a tournament T , let A(T ) be its adjacency matrix. We call the matrix
G(T ) = A(T ) −A(T )t the skew-adjacency matrix of T , where A(T )t is the transpose of
A(T ). A vertex v is called the Condorcet winner of a tournament if the out-degree of v
is n − 1; alternatively, a vertex v is the Condorcet winner if v ≻ u for every u ∈ V ∖ {v}.
Given a set V, we denote the set of all tournaments over V by T(V). A tournament
solution f ∶ ∪∣V∣>0T(V) → 2V ∖ {∅} is a function that takes a tournament as input and
selects a nonempty set of vertices as output. Examples of commonly used tournament
solutions are as follows [MBC+16, Chapter 3].
Condorcet non-loser: The Condorcet non-loser set of a tournament is the set of all
vertices which has at least one outgoing edge.
Copeland set: The Copeland set of a tournament is the set of vertices with maxi-
mum out-degree.
Slater set: Given a tournament T = (V,≻), let us denote the maximal element of V
according to a strict linear order > on V by max(>). The Slater score of a strict linear
order > over V with respect to tournament T = (V, ≻) is ∣ > ∩ ≻ ∣ where > ∩ ≻= {(x,y) ∈
V ×V ∶ x > y,x ≻ y}. A strict linear order is a Slater order if it has maximum Slater score.
Then the Slater set is defined as SL(T ) = {max(>) : > is a Slater order for T }.
Markov set: Given a tournament T = (V,E), we define a Markov chain M(T ) as
follows. The states of the Markov chain M(T ) are the vertices of T and the transition
probabilities are determined by the dominance relation: in every step, stay in the cur-
rent state v with probability ∣D(v)∣/∣T ∣−1, and move to state u with probability 1/∣T ∣−1 for
all u ∈ D(v). The Markov set is the the set of vertices that have maximum probability
in the unique stationary distribution of M(T ). Formally, the transition matrix of the
Markov chain is defined as.
Q =
1
∣T ∣ − 1
(A(T )t + diag(CO))
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where diag(CO) is the diagonal matrix of the Copeland scores. Markov set MA(T ) of
a tournament T is then given byMA(T ) = argmaxa∈V{p(a) ∶ p ∈ ∆(V),Qp = p}.
Bipartisan set: Bipartisan set generalizes the notion of Condorcet winner to lotter-
ies over the vertices of the tournament. Interestingly, for every tournament T = (V,E),
there exists a unique maximal lottery [MBC+16]. That is, there exists a probability
distribution p ∈ ∆(V) such that, for the skew-adjacency matrix G(T ) = (gab)a,b∈V of
T , ∑a,b∈V p(a)q(b)gab ⩾ 0 for all q ∈ ∆(V) which is, by convexity, equivalent to the
following condition.
∑
a∈V
p(a)gab ⩾ 0 for all b ∈ V (1)
Let pT denote the unique maximal lottery of T . Then the bipartisan set BP(T ) of T
is defined as the support of pT . That is,
BP(T ) = {a ∈ V ∶ pT (a) > 0}
Uncovered set: Given a tournament T =(V,≻), we say a vertex v ∈ V covers another
vertex u ∈ V if D(u) ⊆D(v) and is denoted by vCu. We observe that vCu implies v ≻ u
and is equivalent to D¯(v) ⊆ D¯(u). The uncovered set UC(T ) of a tournament T is given
by the set of maximal elements of the covering relation C. That is,
UC(T ) = {v ∈ V ∶ uCv for no u ∈ V}
Banks set: A sub-tournament of a tournament T = (V,E) is an induced subgraph
of T . The Banks set BA(T ) is the set of maximal elements of all the maximal transitive
sub-tournaments of T .
Top cycle: A non-empty subset of vertices B ⊆ V is called dominant in a tournament
T = (V,≻) if x ≻ y for every x ∈ B and y ∈ V ∖ B. Dominant sets are linearly ordered via
set inclusion and the top cycle returns the unique smallest dominant set.
A tournament solution is called neutral if the output does not depend on the names
of the input set of vertices. All the tournament solutions discussed above are neutral.
Essential States in a Markov Chain. A state i in a finite Markov chain is called
essential if for every state j that is reachable from i, the state i is also reachable from
j. A state is called inessential if it is not essential. A well known fact from probability
theory is that, π(i) = 0 for every inessential state i, where π is a stationary distribution
of the Markov chain. Hence, every vertex whose corresponding state in the Markov
chain is inessential, does not belong to the Markov set of that tournament. We refer the
reader to [Bre´13] for a more detailed discussion on Markov chains.
Query Model. Given a tournament T = (V,E) on n vertices, a query for a pair of
vertices {x,y} ∈ P2{V} reveals whether (x,y) ∈ E or (y,x) ∈ E . The query complexity
of an algorithm is the maximum number of queries the algorithm makes in the worst
case. The query complexity of a tournament solution f is the minimum query complexity
of any algorithm for computing f.
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3 Query Complexity Lower Bounds of Tournament So-
lutions
We begin with the following observation which gives us the query complexity of the
Condorcet non-loser set of tournaments.
Observation 3.1 The query complexity of the Condorcet non-loser set in tournaments is
equal to the query complexity of the Condorcet winner in tournaments. Hence, the query
complexity of the Condorcet non-loser set in tournaments is 2n − ⌊logn⌋ − 2.
Proof: Given a tournament T = (V,E), let us define another tournament T = {V,E},
where E = {(x,y) ∶ (y,x) ∈ E}. Now the result follows from the observation that a
vertex v is a Condorcet non-loser in T if and only if v is not the Condorcet winner in T .
Now the 2n − ⌊logn⌋ − 2 query complexity of the Condorcet non-loser set follows from
the 2n−⌊logn⌋−2 query complexity of the Condorcet winner in tournaments [BRS97].
◻
We next consider the query complexity of the Slater set of tournaments. The fol-
lowing result provides a necessary condition for a vertex to belong to the Slater set of
a tournament. We will use it to prove query complexity lower bound of the Slater set.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose the out-degree of a vertex v ∈ V in a tournament T = (V,E) on n
vertices is strictly less than (n−1)/2. Then v does not belong to the Slater set of T .
Proof: Let
−−−−→
V ∖ {v} be any arbitrary order on the vertices in V ∖ {v}. Now the result
follows from the observation that ∣(v ≻
−−−−→
V ∖ {v}) ∩ E∣ < ∣(
−−−−→
V ∖ {v} ≻ v) ∩ E∣. ◻
Let us consider the tournament Treg = (V,E) on n vertices V = {ai ∶ i ∈ [n]}. We
assume n to be an odd integer. In Treg, vertex ai defeats ai+j (mod n) for every i ∈ [n]
and j ∈ [(n−1)/2]. We will use the tournament Treg crucially in our proofs of the query
complexity lower bounds of the Copeland set, the Slater set, and the Markov set. The
following result is immediate from the definition of neutral tournament solutions.
Lemma 3.2 Given the tournament Treg as input, every neutral tournament solution out-
puts the set of all vertices in Treg.
Suppose there exists an edge from a vertex u to another vertex v in Treg. Let T u,vreg
be the tournament which is the same as Treg except the edge from u to v is reversed,
that is, T u,vreg = Treg ∪ {(v,u)} ∖ {(u,v)}. The following lemma will be used crucially in
our proofs of the query complexity lower bounds of the Copeland set, the Slater set,
and the Markov set.
Lemma 3.3 The Copeland set, the Slater set, and the Markov set of T u,vreg do not contain
u.
Proof: Copeland set: For the Copeland set, the result follows from the observation that
u is no longer a vertex with highest out-degree in T u,vreg .
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Slater set: For the Slater set, the result follows immediately from Lemma 3.1 since
the out-degree of u is strictly smaller than (n−1)/2 in T u,vreg .
Markov set: If possible, let us assume that the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain M(T u,vreg ) associated with the tournament T u,vreg be π such that π(a) = p for every
a ∈ [n] ∖ {u,v}. Then we have the following.
p + π(u)
2
n + 1
= π(v) (2)
p
n − 3
n − 1
= π(u) (3)
π(u) + (n − 2)p + π(v) = 1 (4)
We first observe that, since the Markov chain M(T u,vreg ) is ergodic, it has a unique
stationary distribution. Now, since there exists an unique solution to the equations
above, the stationary distribution π of M(T u,vreg ) is indeed of the form we assumed (that
is, π(a) = p for every a ∈ [n] ∖ {u,v}). We observe that equation 3 shows that π(u) < p
and equation 2 shows that p < π(v). Hence, the Markov set of T u,vreg is {v}. ◻
We now prove that any algorithm for finding the Copeland set, the Slater set, and
the Markov set must query every edge in the input tournament in the worst case.
Theorem 3.1 Any algorithm for finding the Copeland set, the Slater set, and the Markov
set of tournaments has query complexity (n
2
).
Proof: Let us consider the tournament Treg. We observe that, due to Lemma 3.2, the
Copeland set, the Slater set, and the Markov set of Treg is the set of all vertices. Let
us now consider the oracle which answers the queries according to Treg. We claim
that any algorithm for finding the Copeland set, the Slater set, and the Markov set
of tournaments must query all the (n
2
) edges of Treg. Suppose not, then there exists
an edge from u to v in Treg for some vertices u and v that the algorithm does not
query. Let Tˆ be the partial tournament of Treg containing the edges that the algorithm
queries. If the output of the algorithm does not contain u, then the oracle completes
Tˆ to Treg and thus the algorithm does not output correctly since the output should
contain all the vertices. On the other hand, if the output of the algorithm contains u
then the oracle completes Tˆ by directing the edge between u and v from v to u and
directing the rest of the edges as in Treg. Again the algorithm outputs wrongly due to
Lemma 3.3. ◻
We now present our query complexity lower bound for the bipartisan set of tourna-
ments. Before embarking on the query complexity lower bound of the bipartisan set,
let us prove a few structural results for the bipartisan set which we will use crucially
later. The following result for the bipartisan set is well known [GLM93, FR95].
Lemma 3.4 In a tournament T = (V,≻), suppose a vertex u covers another vertex v, that
is, u ≻ w whenever v ≻ w for every w ∈ V. Then v does not belong to the bipartisan set of
T .
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The following result shows that, in the tournaments where every vertex has the
same number of incoming edges as the number of outgoing edges, the bipartisan set is
the set of all vertices.
Lemma 3.5 Let T be a tournament on n vertices where the in-degree and out-degree of
every vertex is (n−1)/2. Then the only maximal lottery of T is the uniform distribution over
the set of all vertices of T and thus the bipartisan set of T is the set of all vertices.
Proof: We observe that the uniform distribution over all the vertices satisfy Equa-
tion (1) for the tournament T , since the average of the entries in every column of the
skew-symmetric matrix G of the tournament T is 0. Now the result follows from the
fact that the maximal lottery in every tournament is unique [MBC+16]. ◻
In the next lemma, we formalize the intuition that, if a (A,V∖A) cut in a tournament
has a majority of its edges from V ∖ A to A and A is balanced, then the bipartisan set
of the tournament must include at least one vertex from V ∖A.
Lemma 3.6 Let T = (V1 ∪V2,E) be a tournament such that there exist at most ∣V1∣⋅∣V2∣/2−1
edges from V1 to V2 and the in-degrees and out-degrees of all the vertices in the sub-
tournament T [V1] of T induced on V1 are exactly ∣V1∣−1/2. Then the bipartisan set of T
must include at least one vertex from V2.
Proof: Let p⋆ ∈ ∆(V1 ∪V2) be the maximal lottery of T and V = V1 ∪V2. If possible, let us
assume that p⋆(v) = 0 for every v ∈ V2. Let q ∈ ∆(V2) be the uniform distribution on V2
andG = (gab)a,b∈V the skew-adjacency matrix of T . We first claim that p⋆ cannot be the
uniform distribution on V1. Indeed, otherwise we have ∑a,b∈V p⋆(a)q(b)gab < 0 (since
a strict majority of the edges between V1 and V2 are from V2 to V1) which contradicts
the fact that p⋆ is the maximal lottery of T . We now consider the sub-tournament
T [V1] of T induced on V1. Due to Lemma 3.5, the only maximal lottery of T [V1] is the
uniform distribution on V1. Hence, since p⋆ is not the uniform distribution over V1,
there exists a distribution q′ ∈ ∆(V1) such that ∑a,b∈V1 p
⋆(a)q′(b)gab < 0. However, this
contradicts our assumption that p⋆ is the maximal lottery of T . Hence, the bipartisan
set of T must include at least one vertex from V2. ◻
We now have all the ingredients to present our query complexity lower bound result
for the bipartisan set.
Theorem 3.2 The query complexity of the bipartisan set of a tournament is Ω(n2).
Proof: Let n be an odd integer. We consider a partial tournament T = (A ∪ B,E) where
A = {ai ∶ i ∈ [n]},B = {bi ∶ i ∈ [n]}, and E = {(ai,ai+j (mod n)), (bi,bi+j (mod n)) ∶ i ∈
[n], 1 ⩽ j ⩽ (n−1)/2}. The oracle answers the queries of the algorithm as follows. If a
query comes for an edge between vertices ai and aj or bi and bj for any i, j ∈ [n], then
the oracle answers according to T . If a query comes for an edge between ai and bj for
any i, j ∈ [n], then the oracle says that the edge is oriented from ai to bj. We now claim
that the algorithm must query at least n
2/2 edges between A and B. Suppose not, then,
if the output of the algorithm contains any vertex from B, then the oracle orients every
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edge between A and B, from A to B, thereby ensuring that the output of the algorithm
is wrong due to Lemma 3.4. On the other hand, if the output of the algorithm does
not contain any vertex from B, then the oracle orients all the edges between A and B
that are not queried, from B to A, thereby ensuring that the output of the algorithm is
again wrong due to Lemma 3.6. Hence, the algorithm must query at least n
2/2 edges
between A and B and thus the query complexity of the bipartisan set is Ω(n2). ◻
We now show that the query complexity of the uncovered set is Ω(n2).
Theorem 3.3 The query complexity of the uncovered set of a tournament is Ω(n2).
Proof: Consider a partial tournament T = (A ∪ B ∪ {x},E) where A = {ai ∶ i ∈ [n]},B =
{bi ∶ i ∈ [n]} and E = {(ai,x), (x,bi) ∶ i ∈ [n]}. Let us consider the following oracle.
Let us define the partial tournament T ′ to be the graph on A ∪ B ∪ {x} consisting of
all the answers of the oracle till now. Hence, to begin with, T ′ does not have any
edge. The oracle answers the queries for any edge in T according to T . For any
query of the form {ai,aj} or {bi,bj}, the oracle answers arbitrarily but consistently.
For a query {ai,bj} for some i, j ∈ [n], if ai defeats bk for every k ∈ [n] ∖ {j} in T ′,
then the oracle answers that bj defeats ai; otherwise oracle answers that ai defeats
bj. We claim that any algorithm for finding the uncovered set of tournaments must
query for the pair {ai,bj} for every i, j ∈ [n]. Suppose not, then there exists a pair
{ai,bj} which the algorithm does not query. Notice that, by the design of the oracle,
ai defeats bk in T ′ for every k ∈ [n] such that {ai,bk} has been queried by the
algorithm. For every pair {ak,bℓ} with k, ℓ ∈ [n],k ≠ i and {ak,bℓ} has not been
queried, the oracle orients the edge from bℓ to ak. The oracle also orients all the
edges from ai to bk for every k ∈ [n] ∖ {j}. Now, if the output of the algorithm
contains x, then the oracle orients the edge {ai,bj} from ai to bj. Notice that, in this
case, x is covered by ai and thus x should not be in the uncovered set and hence the
output of the algorithm is wrong. On the other hand, if the output of the algorithm
does not contain x, then the oracle orients the edge {ai,bj} from bj to ai. In this
case, x is not covered by any other vertex and thus x belongs to the uncovered set.
Hence, the algorithm outputs incorrectly in both the cases thereby proving the result. ◻
Next we consider the Banks set and show its query complexity to be Ω(n2).
Theorem 3.4 The query complexity of the Banks set of a tournament is Ω(n2).
Proof: Consider a partial tournament T = (A ∪ B ∪ {x},E), where A = {ai ∶ i ∈ [n]},B =
{bi ∶ i ∈ [n]}, and E = {(ai,x), (x,bi), (bi,bj) ∶ i, j ∈ [n], i > j}. Let us consider the
following oracle. Let us define the partial tournament T ′ to be the graph on A∪B∪{x}
consisting of all the answers of the oracle till now. Hence, to begin with, T ′ does
not have any edge. The oracle answers the queries for any edge in T according
to T . For any query of the form {ai,aj} or {bi,bj}, the oracle answers arbitrarily
but consistently. For a query {ai,bj} for some i, j ∈ [n], if ai defeats bk for every
k ∈ [n] ∖ {j} in T ′, then the oracle answers that bj defeats ai; otherwise oracle answers
that ai defeats bj. We claim that the algorithm must query for the pair {ai,bj} for
every i, j ∈ [n]. Suppose not, then there exists a pair {ai,bj} which the algorithm does
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not query. Notice that, by the design of the oracle, ai defeats bk in T ′ for every k ∈ [n]
such that {ai,bk} has been queried by the algorithm. For every pair {ak,bℓ} with
k, ℓ ∈ [n],k ≠ i and {ak,bℓ} has not been queried, the oracle orients the edge from ak
to bℓ. The oracle also orients all the edges not in T ′ between ai and bk from ai to bk
for every k ∈ [n] ∖ {j}. Now if the output of the algorithm contains x, then the oracle
orients the edge between ai and bj from ai to bj. We claim that x can not be the
maximum vertex of any maximal transitive sub-tournament T ′′ of T . To see this, we
first observe that the sub-tournament T ′′ must have all the vertices in B and no vertex
from A. Indeed, otherwise either x is not the maximum vertex of T ′′ (if any vertex
from A is there in T ′′) or T ′′ is not a maximal transitive sub-tournament (if any vertex
from B is not there in T ′′). However, such a sub-tournament is not a maximal transitive
sub-tournament since ai can be added to T ′′ without violating transitivity. Hence x
does not belong to the Banks set of the resulting tournament and thus the algorithm’s
output is wrong. On the other hand, suppose the output of the algorithm does not
contain x. Then the oracle orients the edge between ai and bj from bj to ai. In this
case, the sub-tournament of T induced on B∪{x} is a maximal sub-tournament where x
is the maximum vertex and thus x belongs to the Banks set of the resulting tournament.
Hence, the algorithm outputs incorrectly in both the cases thereby proving the result. ◻
We now show that the query complexity of the top cycle of tournaments is Ω(n2).
Theorem 3.5 The query complexity of the top cycle of a tournament is Ω(n2).
Proof: We consider a partial tournament T = (A ∪ B,E) where A = {ai ∶ i ∈ [n]},B =
{bi ∶ i ∈ [n]}, and E = {(ai,ai+1 (mod n)), (bi,bi+1 (mod n)) ∶ i ∈ [n]}. The oracle answers
the queries of the algorithm as follows. If a query comes for the edge between vertices
ai and aj or bi and bj for any i, j ∈ [n], then the oracle answers according to T if
the edge is present in T , and arbitrarily but consistently otherwise. If a query comes
for an edge between ai and bj for any i, j ∈ [n], then the oracle says that the edge is
oriented from ai to bj. Now we claim that the algorithm must query all the n2 edges
between A and B. Suppose not, then there exist ai and bj for some i, j ∈ [n] such that
the algorithm has not queried for the edge between ai and bj. Now if the output of
the algorithm does not contain any vertex from B, then the oracle orients the edge
between ai and bj from bj to ai. Notice that, in this case the top cycle of the resulting
tournament T contains at least one vertex bj ∈ B and thus the algorithm does not
output correctly in this case. On the other hand, if the output of the algorithm contains
any vertex from B, then the oracle orients all the edges between A and B from A
to B. In this case, the top cycle of the resulting tournament is A and thus the algo-
rithm again fails to output correctly. Hence, the algorithmmust makeΩ(n2) queries. ◻
4 Results for Tournaments with Small Top Cycle
It turns out that, if we a priori know that the size of the top cycle in the input tourna-
ment is at most k, then there is an algorithm for finding the top cycle with much less
number of queries.
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Theorem 4.1 Suppose we know that the top cycle of the input tournament T is of size at
most k. Then there exists an algorithm for finding the top cycle of T with query complexity
O(nk + n logn/log(1−1/k)).
Proof: We first partition the set of vertices V into ⌈n/2k⌉ subsets Vi, i ∈ ⌈n/2k⌉, each of
size at most 2k. For each partition, we query all pair of vertices. We notice that, in each
set Vi of the partition, there must exist at least one vertex vi with in-degree at least
k (for every k larger than some small constant) and consequently vi does not belong
to the top cycle of T for every i ∈ ⌈n/2k⌉. We delete the vertex vi from Vi for every
i ∈ ⌈n/2k⌉, thereby deleting ⌈n/2k⌉ vertices in total. The now iterate the same process
on the remaining set of vertices. The first iteration takes O((n/k)k2) = O(nk) queries.
From the next iteration onwards, we can manage with only n queries per iteration by
partitioning the vertices cleverly: since we have deleted exactly one vertex from each
set of the partition we can add one vertex to each set of the partition by “breaking”
some of the sets from the partition. We now observe that, in every set, we now need
to compare the new vertex with the rest of the vertices thereby requiring at most n − k
queries in total. Since, each iteration decreases the size of the tournament by a factor
of Ω(1 − 1/k), after O(logn/log(1−1/k)) iterations, we have O(k) vertices in the tournament
where we can find the top cycle using O(k2) = O(nk) queries. Hence, the query
complexity of our algorithm is O(nk + n logn/log(1−1/k)). The correctness of the algorithm
follows from the fact that whenever we remove a vertex v from the tournament, v does
not belong to the top cycle of T . ◻
The following result gives relationship between the top cycle of a tournament and
other tournament solutions like the Copeland set, the Slater set, the Markov set, the
bipartisan set, the uncovered set, and the Banks set.
Lemma 4.1 Let T be a tournament whose top cycle is C. Then the Copeland set, the Slater
set, the Markov set, the bipartisan set, the uncovered set, and the Banks set of T are the
same as the corresponding solutions for the tournament T (C).
Proof: Copeland set, bipartisan set, uncovered set: Follows from the observation that
every vertex in C covers every vertex in V ∖ C and Lemma 3.4.
Markov set: All the states corresponding to the vertices in V ∖ C are inessential and
thus do not belong to the Markov set of T .
Slater set: We observe that, in the Slater order ≻ of the tournament T , every vertex
in C must be preferred over every vertex in V ∖C. If not, then let there be a vertex a ∈ C
and b ∈ V ∖C such that a immediately follows b in ≻. Then by swapping the positions of
the vertices a and b in ≻, we can strictly decrease the disagreement of ≻ with T thereby
contradicting that ≻ is a Slater order of T .
Banks set: Follows from the fact that every maximal element of every maximal
sub-tournament of T belongs to C. ◻
Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.1 immediately give the the following query complexity
upper bound for the Copeland set, the Slater set, the Markov set, the bipartisan set, the
uncovered set, and the Banks set when we a priori know that the size of the top cycle
of the input tournament is at most k.
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Theorem 4.2 Suppose we know that the top cycle of the input tournament T is of size
at most k. Then there exists an algorithm for finding the Copeland set, the Slater set,
the Markov set, the bipartisan set, the uncovered set, and the Banks set of T with query
complexity O(nk + n logn/log(1−1/k)).
Proof: We first find the top cycle C of T using Theorem 4.1. This step requires
O(nk + n logn/log(1−1/k)) queries. Next, we query for all the pair of vertices in C and
output the corresponding solution of T (C). The correctness of the algorithm follows
immediately from Lemma 4.1. Since the second step requires O(k2) = O(nk) queries,
the query complexity of our algorithm is O(nk + n logn/log(1−1/k)). ◻
5 Conclusion and Future Directions
We have shown that, for finding many common tournament solutions, one has to query,
in the worst case, almost entire set of edges in the tournament. On the positive side,
we have exhibited an important structural property, in terms of the top cycle of the
tournament being small, which substantially reduces the query complexity of common
tournament solutions. An immediate future direction of research is to study query
complexity for other tournament solutions like the minimal covering set, the minimal
extending set, the minimal TC-retentive set, the tournament equilibrium set, etc. Find-
ing other structural properties of the tournament that can be leveraged to reduce the
query complexity of common tournament solutions is another important direction of
future research.
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